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THE ROLE OF THE CONCEPT OF 
RESPONSIBILITY IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 
PROCEEDINGS 
FRANCIS BARRY McCARTHY* 
To what side soever we turn our eyes, we are presented 
with a confused scene of contradictions, uncertainty, 
hardships, and arbitrary power. In the present age, we 
seem universally aiming at perfection; let us not there-
fore neglect to perfect the laws on which our lives and 
fortunes depend. 
Voltaire 
The juvenile justice system is caught in a crosscurrent of con-
flicting philosophies. Contemporary thought perceives the juvenile 
court simultaneously as an instrument of social control designed to 
deal with the criminal activities of children and as a therapeutic 
institution providing assistance, guidance and treatment to children 
in need. While these objectives would not necessarily seem to be 
mutually exclusive, in both practice and theory the juvenile court 
has frequently been torn between the traditional theories and pur-
poses of the criminal law, and those provided by a medical model 
which see~ criminal or delinquent behavior as the product of a 
sickness or disease. This dilemma is more apparent in the juvenile 
court than in any other social institution. 
The juvenile court found its principal formative impetus in a 
growing dissatisfaction with the criminal process. 1 Reformers de-
vised an alternative system which called extensively upon the 
behavioral and social sciences to diagnose the causes of crimes 
committed by children and tu fashion means through which these 
causes could be eliminated at the outset, or through which the 
effects or symptoms could be treated and cured. In this respect, 
legal institutions almost completely relegated responsibility for the 
operation of the juvenile court to the behavioral sciences. While 
the "symptom" which was the basis for the official intervention by 
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. A.B., 1%7, Stonehill College; 
J.D., 1971, Boston College; LL.M., 1975, Columbia University. 
1 See note 
0
29 and accompanying text infra. 
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the juvenile court generally remained defined in terms of criminal 
acts, 2 the content and significance of these acts were determined 
almost exclusively by behavioral science standards. Consequently, 
juvenile courts abandoned many fundamental principles of the 
criminal law. 
Many students of juvenile law consider the juvenile court's de-
parture from the principles of the criminal law to be the mark of 
enlightenment since the criminal law is thought to be based on 
anachronistic concepts. It is suggested here, however, that a sub-
stantial amount of the wisdom of the criminal law which was 
incorporated through centuries of development, along with the 
valuable interests that it protected, has been too cavalierly dis-
missed. 
The exclusive focus of this article is upon proceedings in which 
delinquency is· determined, even though the juvenile court gener-
ally possesses a broad jurisdiction which covers a variety of mat-
ters other than delinquency. There is, however, a fundamental 
difference between delinquency proceedings and those involving 
dependency, neglect, or some other domestic problems. These 
latter proceedings attempt to resolve matters usually concerned 
with the whole fabric of a family situation and the problems in-
volved therein. A delinquency proceeding, by contrast, has as its 
primary jurisdictional base the actions of the child. It is quite 
possible that a child who is engaging in antisocial conduct is doing 
· so because of problems at home. In this sense, the inquiries of all 
these proceedings may be directed toward solving similar prob-
lems, but this is not necessarily the case. Quite often children are 
found to be delinquent in instances in which there would be no 
occasion for intervention by a juvenile court under its dependency 
or neglect jurisdiction. In such instances the child has done an act 
which amounts merely to a crime. 3 
Since the conduct upon which delinquency is based is usually 
criminal in nature, 4 and since the dispositional alternatives avail-
able to the juvenile court frequently resemble the punishment 
imposed upon adults, 5 it is necessary to determine to what extent 
the jurisprudence of the criminal law is or should be applicable to a 
delinquency proceeding. This analysis is not undertaken with the 
belief that the criminal law has arrived at a state of perfection or 
that it possesses all the answers to the problems of delinquency. 
2 See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM 
JUVENILE COURT AcT § 2(2} (1968). See also note 42 and accompanying text infra. 
3 See note 58 and accompanying text infra. 
4 See note 42 and accompanying text infra. 
5 See note 156 and accompanying text infra. 
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However, this article suggests that the principles of the criminal 
law reflect important social values of which the juvenile law should 
be ever mindful. 
Recently the efforts of both the President's Commission of Law 
Enforcement and Administration of Justice6 and the United States 
Supreme Court7 have directed substantial attention to the juvenile 
justice system. The decisions, legislation, and articles which have 
grown out of these efforts have centered almost exclusively upon 
the procedural aspects of the juvenile justice system. Such consid-
erations are, of course, extremely important; but they alone do not 
address a variety of other problems inherent in a legal system that 
deals with youthful offenders, nor can they determine the proper 
substantive bases upon which societal intervention should be au-
thorized. In many respects, an exclusive preoccupation with pro-
cedural safeguards can result in a situation not unlike that de-
scribed in Samuel Butler's Erewhon, in which the man was tried 
with what might be perceived as the fullest of due process rights for 
the offense of having contracted consumption. 
In an attempt to move beyond purely procedural limitations, 
therefore, this article seeks to determine the role which the concept 
of criminal responsibility, or mens rea, should play in a juvenile 
delinquency proceeding. Without presuming to effect any changes 
in dispositional alternatives, this article seeks to illuminate the 
principles of law which authorize governmental intervention in the 
life of a child and his family to determine under what circumstances 
a government has license to deprive a child of his liberty. To 
achieve this, a brief survey will be made of the common law rules 
of responsibility and the way these rules have been applied in the 
juvenile courts. Then, through a consideration of the writings of 
several philosophers, principles will be identified which suggest 
that the concept of responsibility has a definite role to play in 
juvenile law. 
I. THE PRINCIPLES OF RESPONSIBILITY 
A. Responsibility in the Criminal Law 
It is a fundamental principle of Anglo-American criminallaw that 
both actus reus and mens rea must be established before an indi-
vidual may be convicted of a criminal offense. Actus reus refers to 
the conduct, (taking and carrying off of the property of another), 
6 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 
TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME (1967). 
7 See cases at notes 48-52 and accompanying text infra. 
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and sometimes the consequences (death of a human being) pro-
scribed by the criminal law. 8 In general, this doctrine requires 
act9 by the individual which consists of a voluntary bodily move-
ment. 10 This doctrine excludes from the criminal process those 
events or results which, although prohibited by the criminal law, 
are the product of an involuntary action, such as a convulsion or a 
spasm, or which occur under conditions which render the action 
involuntary, such as unconsciousness, sleep, or hypnosis .11 
In addition to the physical element of a crime, actus reus, the law 
also requires that mens rea, the mental element of the crime, be 
established. It is very difficult to state concisely or precisely what 
constitutes the mental element of crimes, partly because require-
ments may vary from one crime to another.12 However, mens rea 
can be simply defined as the intention to do the act which society 
has made penal, 13 or the intent to do the act with knowledge of the 
circumstances that make the act a criminal offense. 14 Only when 
both actus reus and mens rea are present can an individual be held 
criminally responsible. At common law this was true for children 
as well as for adults. 
The law, however, has always dealt with children in a somewhat 
different manner than their adult counterparts. The common law 
principles of capacity regarding age can be perceived as developing 
three major categories. 15 First, children under seven had no crimi-
• For a discussion of the historical development of the doctrine of actus reus in which it is 
shown that the term itself is of relatively recent origin. see J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
OF CRIMINAL LAW 222-28 (2d ed. 1960). The doctrine itself is much older than its terminol-
ogy and is a firmly rooted principle of criminal law. 
9 Omissions may also be characterized as acts. Although there are differences between 
acts and omissions, they are not central to our discussion here. See W. LAFAVE & A. 
SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 182 (1972). 
10 Id. at 179. 
11 See MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.0 (2). (Prop. Official Draft L9 2, 1962). The drafters of the 
Model Penal Code have made the following observations: "People whose involuntary 
movements threaten hann to others may present a public health or safety problem, calling 
for therapy or even for custodial commitment; they do not present a problem of correction." 
12 This point was illustrated by Professors LaFave and Scott: "Crimes may be classified, 
according to their mental aspects. into (I) crimes requiring subjective fault, (2) crimes 
requiring objective fault, and (3) crimes imposing liability without fault. The principal types 
of mental culpability in crimes requiring fault are (I) intention, (2) knowledge, (3) reckless-
ness, and (4) negligence." W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 9, at 191. 
13 See HALL, supra note 8, at 71, citing Stallybrass, in THE MODERN APPROACH i;o 
CRIMINAL LAW 406 (L. Radzinowicz & J. Turner ed. 1945). 
14 Id., citing Devlin. Statutory Offenses, 4 J. Soc. Pue. TEACHERS L. 213 (1958). This 
definition excludes strict liability crimes, but these are virtually nonexistent in juvenile 
court. 
15 Under Roman law a child was not responsible until he or she had attained the age of 
seven. It does not appear that infancy was a defense in the early stages of the common law. 
However. children were usually pardoned for their transgressions. By the tenth century. a 
statute prohibited the capital punishment of children under fifteen unless surrender was 
refused or an escape was attempted. By the fourteenth century it was established that a child 
was not criminally responsible until he or she reached the age of seven. In 1338 it was 
determined that a child over seven was also presumed to lack capacity to commit a crime. 
During this period the age at which the presumption of incapacity ceased to operate was not 
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nal capacity. Second, children were held to the same standards as 
adults when they attained the age of fourteen. Third, children 
between the ages of seven and fourteen were presumed to be 
without capacity, but this presumption could be rebutted in an 
individual case. 16 
These principles formed the basis of the law of responsibility for 
children as it developed in the United States, 1 7 and they were 
frequently adopted in many of the early commentaries on Ameri-
can criminal law .18 In addition, the American case law developed 
special rules of evidence which in some instances were designed to 
protect children further. In both State v. Aaron 19 and State v. 
Bostick, 20 the court fashioned special exclusionary rules regarding 
the use of the extrajudicial confessions of children who were being 
criminally prosecuted. In many respects, therefore, the law was 
highly solicitous of children and as the law developed the prosecu-
tion needed to show not only that the child had the requisite intent 
to commit the offense (mens rea), but also that he had the capacity 
to form that intent. 
The defenses available under the common law also illustrate the 
rules regarding the responsibility of chilren. 21 Both the defenses of 
infancy and insanity, which excluded children from legal liability, 
were permitted for juvenile criminals and were perceived as being 
intimately related, often by statute. 22 
The insanity and infancy defenses shared a common path of 
development. The various tests used to determine incapacity under 
the infancy defense usually mirrored those used for insanity. The 
M' Naghten 23 right-wrong test for insanity was adopted in Ameri-
clearly defined, but with a child over seven the presumption could. be rebutted. By the 
seventeenth century fourteen became the age of full responsibility. See W. LAFAVE & A. 
SCOTT, supra note 9, at 351. 
16 Id. at 351-52. The authors also point out that the age of responsibility may have earlier 
been fixed at twelve, at least for capital offenses. Id. at 352 n.7. 
17 See State v. Doherty, 2 Tenn. 79 (1806); Walker's Case, 5 City-Hall Recorder 137 (New 
York City 1820). 
18 See, e.g .. I. BROWNE, THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 5 (1892); J. P. BISHOP, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW chp. ]3 (1796); R. BURNS, ABRIDGMENT OF THE 
AMERICAN JUSTICE 248 (2d ed. 1792). 
19 4 N.J.L. 231 (1818). 
20 4 Del. (4 Harr.) 563 (1845). 
21 See Fox, Responsibility in the Juvenile Court, 11 WM. & MARYL. REv. 659 (1970). See 
also, Michael & Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide (pt. 2), 37 CoLUM. L. REV. 
1261, 1265 n.15 (1937). 
22 This fact was demonstrated by a colonial statute in 1641 which provided: "Children, 
Idiots. Distracted Persons, and all that are strangers or new comers to our plantation, shall 
have such allowances as religion and reason require." The Body of Liberties of 1641, No. 52, 
in THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACAHUSETTS OF 1660-1672, at 45 (Whitmore ed. 1889), 
quoted in Fox, supra note 21, at 660. · 
23 M'Naghten's Case, '!l Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). 
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can law to serve as the test for infancy as well. 24 Infancy, as a 
defense peculiar to children, provides an excellent reference within 
which principles of responsibility can be explored. One can more 
fully comprehend the principles of responsibility in the law by 
examining those who are excluded from liability. 25 Thus, if a child 
was not blameworthy, or could not have been deterred because she 
did not know the nature or illegality of her actions, then it was, of 
course, quite logical to conclude that she was not a proper subject 
for punishment. 26 
It is important to note, however, that the absence of infancy and 
insanity is not coextensive with the concepts of criminal responsi-
bility embodied in the requirement of mens rea. One might have 
been capable of forming a criminal intent, but not have intended 
the act in any particular case. This is a simple point but one which, 
if not recognized, can generate considerable confusion. It has been 
suggested, for example, that "[i]nsanity and infancy constituted 
the only substantive law defenses exculpatingjuvenile criminals on 
grounds of irresponsibility. " 27 Obviously, this is not always the 
case. Even in an action in which insanity is not raised as a defense 
and in which a child is demonstrated to have the requisite capacity 
(e.g., can distinguish between right and wrong), it still must be 
shown that the child possessed the requisite intent to commit the 
act. In addition, all defenses otherwise available to adults, such as 
mistake, duress, necessity, self-defense, or consent, were applica-
ble to juveniles. 
Thus, it may be true that a person, whether adult or child, who 
does not know the nature and quality of his action or who cannot 
distinguish between right and wrong, lacks the capacity to form the 
mental part of a crime necessary for conviction. It is not necessar-
ily true, however, that those persons who do not successfully meet 
the tests and thereby fail to establish the defense of insanity or 
24 See Commonwealth v. Rogers. 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500, 501-03 (1844). It has been 
suggested that the right-wrong test was part of American jurisprudence much earlier. See 
Platt & Diamond, The Origins of the "'Right and Wrong" Test of Criminal Responsibility 
and Its Subsequent Development in the United States: An Historical Survey, 54 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1227, 1257 (1966). For some earlier examples in which this nexus can be seen, see 
Commonwealth v. French, Thacher's Criminal Cases 163, 165 (Mass. 1827); Clark's Case, I 
City-Hall Recorder 177 (New York City 1816). 
25 H.L.A. Hart has added much to an understanding of the principles of punishment by 
employing precisely this sort of approach. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSI-
BILITY, at 28-53 (1968). 
26 See Benbow v. State, 128 Ala. 1, 29 So. 533 (1901); Price v. State, 50Tex. Crim. 71, 95 
S.W. 901 (1906). 
27 Fpx, supra note 21, at 659. There is no real doubt that Professor Fox understands the 
distinction being made in the text. He is dealing with a very narrow issue, in which context 
this statement's intent is quite clear. It is important to keep in mind the broader sphere 
within which these concepts are operating, however. 
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infancy are found to possess the necessary mens rea. This point is 
one that anyone· who has studied criminal law even in the most 
cursory way would grasp immediately. Nevertheless, some writers 
on juvenile law have apparently confused these two principles. 28 
It is important to note that the principles of criminal liability at 
common law applied equally to both adults and children. In both 
instances the criminal sanction was imposed only upon proof of the 
commission of an offense and all the requisite elements, including 
mens rea, of that offense. The only difference between the child 
and the adult was that the former was aided by a presumption 
which had the same force for those children between the ages of 
seven and fourteen as that which would be occasioned by the prima 
facie showing of insanity by an adult. If this obstacle to prosecution 
were overcome, the principles of criminal responsibility for adults 
and children were identical. 
B. Responsibility in the Juvenile Court 
During the nineteenth century a movement arose to seek alterna-
tive means of dealing with children apart from the criminal process. 
The historical development of this reform movement and the moti-
vations of its members are the subjects of considerable dispute. 29 
Traditional accounts characterized the participants as high-minded 
individuals possessing only laudable humanitarian ambitions. More 
recently, commentators have portrayed these "crusaders" as con-
niving rascals intent only upon protecting and feeding their own 
selfish interests. 30 Whether their efforts were prompted by noble or 
base motives, they nevertheless achieved a significant change in 
legal principles and institutions. 
The first major accomplishment of the early reformers is gener-
ally recognized as the founding of the New York House of Refuge 
in I 824. The act which established the House of Refuge granted the 
Manager of the Society for the Reformation of Juvenile Delin-
quents 31 the power "to receive and take into the House of Refuge 
... all such children as shall be taken up or committed as vagrants, 
or convicted of criminal offenses ... as may ... be proper ob-
28 See discussion note 63 and accompanying text infra. 
29 For an example of this debate. compare the historical accounts found in In re Gault. 387 
U.S. I, 14-18 (1%7), with that found in A. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS 46-74 (1969). See 
also, Fox. Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 
(1970). 
30 See Fox, supra note 29, at 1225-28. 
31 This society was earlier known as the Society for the Prevention of Pauperism. For an 
account of the society's previous activities, see Fox. supra note 29. at 1189-92. 
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jects. . " 32 The act required that commitment to the House of 
Refuge be made by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
The concern of the reformers, however, extended far beyond 
simply those children who were criminal or incorrigible. The 
child-savers, as these Victorian reformers came co be called, de-
sired to protect and salvage those children who were the victims of 
vicious environments, unfortunate heredity, or cruel treatment at 
the hands of parents, guardians, or employers. 33 These reformers 
saw the city slums as havens for the penniless and criminal, reflect-
ing the lowest forms of degradation and misery; they saw the 
juvenile inhabitants of these areas as "moral wrecks" and "intel-
lectual dwarfs. " 34 
The reformers grew impatient while waiting for court adjudica-
tion, a prerequisite to their aid of these unfortunates. Their senti-
ment was that the best possible system of juvenile justice should 
not separate the adjudicative and treatment functions. The refor-
mers therefore urged the possibility of examining the potential 
disposition of the child before or during the trial stage. Charles 
Cooley, a noted scholar of the time, observed that if a child is going 
to enter upon a criminal career, "let us try to catch him at a tender 
age, and subject him to rational social discipline, such as is already 
successful in enough cases to show that it might be greatly ex-
tended. " 35 The concept qf predelinquency was already manifest in 
an 1823 report of the Society for the Prevention of Pauperism in the 
City of New York: 
Many of these are young people on whom the charge of crime 
cannot be fastened, and whose only fault is, that they have no 
one on earth to take care of them, and that they are incapable 
of providing for themselves. Hundreds, it is believed, thus 
circumstanced, eventually have recourse to petty thefts; or, if 
females, they descend to practice of infamy, in order to save 
themselves from the pinching assaults of cold and hunger. 36 
It was felt that ''traditional forms of punishment and redemption 
were not appropriate for persons who were not deserving of moral 
recognition." 37 Such children were not individuals but merely the 
products of their environments. 
Further, the child-savers were appalled by the operation of the 
32 Act of March 29, 1824, ch. 126 § 4 [1824] N .Y. LAWS 111. 
33 A. PLATT, supra note 29, at 36-43. 
34 Id. at 40-41. 
as C. COOLEY, NATURE V. NURTURE IN MAKING OF SOCIAL CAREERS 405 (1896), quoted 
in A. PLATT, supra note 29, at 28. 
36 SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF PAUPERISM IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT ON 
THE SUBJECT OF ERECTING A HOUSE OF REFUGE FOR VAGRANT AND DEPRAVED YOUNG 
PEOPLE (1823), reprinted in Fox, supra note 29, at 1191 n.25. 
37 A. PLATT, supra note 29, at 28. 
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criminal process on children. The fact that children could be given 
long prison terms, could be confined with hardened adult crimi-
nals, or could be placed in penal institutions at all, greatly offended 
the reformers, who felt that society owed a duty to children which 
extended beyond a simple concept of justice. They saw society's 
role as not merely ascertaining whether the child was guilty of an 
offense but also asked, ''.[w]hat is he, how has he become what he 
is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the interest of 
the state to save him from a downward career[?]" 38 They focused 
their efforts, therefore, on removing from the child-saving institu-
tions any idea of retribution, which they saw as solely cruel and 
barbaric. 
In 1899 the Illinois legislature gave the first official legislative 
recognition to the juvenile court as a tribunal to serve as a 
specialized court concerned with children. The enabling legislation 
articulated the spirit of the reformers. "This act shall be liberally 
construed to the end that its purpose may be carried out, to wit, the 
care, custody and discipline of a child shall approximate as nearly 
as may be that which should be given by its parents .... " 39 
The Illinois Act served as a model for legislation in other 
states. 40 As early as 1928 all but two states had adopted a juvenile 
court system. 41 Such legislation authorized broad governmental 
intervention in circumstances which had previously been ignored 
by the judicial system. 42 
38 Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HAltV. L. REv. 104, 119-20 (1909). But see Fox, supra 
note 29, at 1238. 
39 The act provided that the juvenile court was to have jurisdiction over any child who: 
is destitute or homeless or abandoned; or dependent upon the public for support, or 
has not proper parental care or guardianship; or who habitually begs or receives 
alms; or who is found living in any house of ill fame or with any vicious or 
disreputable person; or whose home, by reason of neglect, cruelty or depravity on 
the part of its parents, guardian, or other person in whose care it may be, is an unfit 
place for such a child; and any child under the age of 8 years who is found peddling 
or selling any article or singing or playing any musical instrument upon the streets 
or giving any public entertainment. 
Act of April 21, 1899, ILL. LAWS 131. For a discussion of the regressive side of this act, see 
Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform, supra note 29, at 1221-30. . 
40 Juvenile courts were established in Wisconsin (1901), New York (1901), Ohio (1902), 
Maryland (1902), and Colorado (1903). · 
41 A. PLATT, supra note 29, at 139. 
42 Broadly defined jurisdiction remained until very recently. In 1959 Frederick Sussmann 
compiled the following list of acts or conditions included in delinquency definitions or 
descriptions. They are presented in decreasing order of frequency. 
I. Violates any law or ordinance 
2. Habitually truant 
3. (Knowingly) associates with thieves, vicious or immoral persons 
4. Incorrigible 
5. Beyond control of parent or guardian 
6. Growing up in idleness or crime 
7. So deports self as to injure or endanger self or others 
8. Absents self from home (without just cause) without consent 
9. Immoral or indecent conduct 
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The theory behind such widespread jurisdiction was that the 
state would assume the role of a beneficent parent who would act 
in the best interest of the child. Legislatures found support for this 
idea in the chancery doctrine of parens patriae and in cases such as 
Regina v Gynga/1, 43 where it was stated: 
[T]he jurisdiction ... arising as it does from the power of the 
Crown delegated to the Court of Chancery, ... is essentially a 
parental jurisdiction, and that description ofit involves that the 
main consideration to be acted upon in its exercise is the 
benefit or welfare of the child. Again, the term "welfare" in 
this connection must be read in its largest possible sense, that 
is to say, as meaning that every circumstance must be taken 
into consideration, and the Court must do what under the 
circumstances a wise parent acting for the true interests of the 
child would or ought to do. 44 
In line with this approach, reformers asserted that delinquency 
proceedings were equitable or civil in nature. Thus, the whole body 
of criminal jurisprudence was irrelevant to the administration of 
juvenile justice. Since punishment was not a consequence of delin-
quency proceedings and only those dispositions which would best 
10. (Habitually) uses vile, obscene or vulgar language (in public place) 
11. (Knowingly) enters, visits house of ill repute 
12. Patronizes, visits policy shop or gaming place 
13. (Habitually) wanders about railroad yards or tracks 
14. Jumps t~ains or enters car or engine without authority 
15. Patronizes saloon or dram house where intoxicating liquor is sold 
16. Wanders streets at night, not on lawful business 
17. Patronizes public poolroom or bucketshop 
18. Immoral conduct around school (or in public place) 
19. Engages in illegal occupation 
20. In occupation or situation dangerous or injurious to self or others 
21. Smokes cigarettes (or uses tobacco in any form) 
22. Frequents place whose existence violates law 
23. Is found in place for permitting which adult may be punished 
24. Addicted to drugs 
25. Disorderly 
26. Begging 
27. Uses intoxicating liquor 
28. Makes indecent proposal 
29. Loiters, sleeps in alleys, vagrant 
30. Runs away from state or charity institution 
31. Found on premises occupied or used for illegal purposes 
32. Operates motor vehicle dangerously while under the influence of liquor 
33. Attempts to marry without consent, in violation of law 
34. Given to sexual irregularities 
F. SusSMANN, LAW OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 21 (rev. 2d ed. 1959). 
43 2 Q.B. 233 (1893). 
44 Id. at 248. The fact that the jurisdiction of the Chancery Court as parens patriae was 
exercised almost exclusively in cases where the property rights of minors were in jeopardy 
was ignored. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINIS-
TRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 2 
(1967). 
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aid the child's development were to be permitted, there was no 
need to follow the rigid definitions of the criminal law, or the 
procedural safeguards necessary in criminal prosecutions. Such 
formalities would only hamper or impede the provision of help to 
the child. 
The reformers articulated no real distinction between neglected 
children and delinquent children. They felt that all children under 
fourteen "may be classed together ... for there is no distinction 
between pauper, vagrant, and criminal children, which would re-
quire a different system of treatment. " 45 The objective of the 
philosophy was that the government provide the necessary help 
and guidance to children who might otherwise embark upon a life 
of crime. The theory was prediction-oriented because it sought to 
direct potential offenders toward lives as good citizens. Whether 
the child had already committed a crime or whether he was simply 
growing up in poverty or idleness had no real significance other 
than to serve as a signal that he might one day be the grist of the 
criminal law mill. The reformers viewed the child's status or con-
duct, in almost medical terms, as the symptom of an oncoming 
disease. 46 
This view of governmental obligations and solicitude has served 
as a justification for the juvenile justice system to the present. 
Although there have been numerous attacks launched against the 
system on a variety of grounds, most have been successfully met 
by the mere incantation of the "best interest of the child" refrain.47 
The juvenile justice system was not significantly rocked until 
1967 when the United States Supreme Court decided what has 
been hailed as a landmark case, In re Gault. 48 That case, which 
involved entirely procedural issues, held that a child charged with a 
criminal offense in the juvenile court must be provided with some 
of the safeguards available in a criminal prosecution. 49 The sub-
sequent Supreme Court cases of In re Winship, 50 McKeiver v. 
Pennsylvania, 51 and Breed v. Jones, 52 further delineated the pro-
45 M. CARPENTER, WHAT SHOULD BE DONE FOR THE NEGLECTED AND CRIMINAL CHIL-
DREN OF THE UNITED STATES (1885), quoted in Fox, supra note 29, at 1193. 
46 It has been suggested that there was a darker side to this philosophy. For a more 
detailed discussion of the regressive side of this movement. see Fox. supra note 29. at 
1193-95. 
41 See, e.g .. In re Gault. 387 U.S. I. 15 (1967). 
48 387 U.S. I (1.967). 
49 The Court held that the child must be afforded I) Notice of the charges, 2) Right to 
counsel, 3) Right to confrontation and cross-examination. and 4) Privilege against self-
incrimination. The Court refused to declare a constitutionally required right to a transcript of 
the proceedings. or to appellate review. 
so 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). 
51 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (no right to jury trial). 
52 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (double jeopardy applicable to juvenile proceedings). 
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cedural aspects which were to be observed by the juvenile court. 
The Court attempted to walk a narrow line between what it recog-
nized as the obviously laudatory objective of the juvenile court and 
what it recognized as the clearly penal character of the dispositions 
being made by those courts. Since the statute which provided for 
Gault's commitment and the whole history of juvenile court com-
mitments in general were perceived as civil in nature, the Supreme 
Court stopped short of declaring a delinquency proceeding to be a 
criminal prosecution. The Court made it clear, however, that a 
"proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found 
'delinquent' and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is 
comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution. " 53 
These decisions had the immediate effect of giving certain rights 
to a child against whom a petition alleging delinquency was lodged. 
Several states subsequently undertook a revision of their juvenile 
court statutes in an attempt to establish different categories of 
children whose conduct was called into question and the proce-
dures for and means of dealing with these children. 54 Previously, in 
many states the category of delinquent included behavior by chil-
dren which was deemed offensive or dangerous but which was not 
criminal. 55 When the revisions of these codes were undertaken, 
many states reserved the category of "delinquent" for those in-
stances in which the conduct was such that it amounted to a 
criminal offense. 56 Legislators felt that the Gault decision would 
cover only these cases. Other categories were established to cover 
the non-criminal conduct of children which would remain the ob-
ject of scrutiny by the juvenile court. 57 
Even though most states now require the child to commit an act 
which would amount to a crime if she were an adult before the child 
may be found delinquent, they have attached very little signifi-
cance to the general principles of criminal liability in substantive 
law terms when a d~termination of delinquency is being made. It is 
not entirely clear in juvenile law today whether the government 
must establish that the child possessed the requisite mens rea to 
53 387 u .s. I. 36. 
54 See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE § 2151.01 (Page 1973) which went into effect in 1969. 
55 See note 48 supra. ' 
56 Typical is the Uniform Juvenile Court Act which provides that a " 'delinquent act' 
means an act designated a crime under the law, including local [ordinances] or resolutions of 
this state, or of another state if the act occurred in that state, or under federal law .... " 
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM 
JUVENILE COURT ACT § 2(2) (1968). 
57 Tlie Uniform Juvenile Court Act uses the category "unruly." The Comment to the 
section states: "The 'unruly child' category is needed to limit the disposition that can be 
made of a child who is in need of treatment or rehabilitation, but who has committed no 
offense applicable to adults .... " Id. at § 2t4). 
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commit the offense, or simply whether she performed an act which 
was proscribed by the criminal law regardless of her intent. Part of 
the uncertainty stems from the language legislators employed when 
defining delinquency. 
The New York Family Court Act, for example, defines a juvenile 
delinquent as "a person over 7 and less than 16 years of age who 
does any act which, if done by an adult would constitute a 
crime. " 58 By its choice of words, did the New York legislature 
intend to focus exclusively on the actus reus element of an offense? 
The legislature may only have been attempting to set a finding of 
delinquency apart from a criminal conviction and · chose those 
words to impart that significance. A strict statutory interpretation, 
however, could conclude that mens rea is irrelevant to a finding of 
delinquency. 
It is not necessary to strain at statutory construction, however, 
for cases have arisen which indicate the juvenile court has departed 
from the traditional principles of responsibility. In In re DiM ag-
gio, 59 a thirteen-year-old boy was found delinquent after he had 
discharged a revolver and injured another child. The juvenile court 
specifically found that DiMaggio did not willfully discharge the 
gun, that he did not intend to inflict any injury, and that what had 
occurred was purely accidental. 60 The court nevertheless found the 
child to be delinquent. The court did begin to perceive the implica-
tions of such a holding and avoided confronting the mens rea and 
actus reus problems by finding that the child had violated a law 
requiring all persons in possession of certain firearms to have a 
permit. The boys father, who owned the gun, had a valid permit, 
but since the child did not have a permit when he "possessed" the 
gun, he had committed an offense under the law. 
It is unclear from the opinion whether the court considered the 
offense to be one of strict liability for which no intent was neces-
sary. The court did, nowever, discuss the question of whether the 
child was presumed to know the firearms law, and concluded that 
although it was a fiction, the child was nevertheless bound by that 
presumption. 61 By employing this device the court demonstrated 
its appreciation of the problems involved but chose to skirt them. 
In another case, the attitude of the juvenile court concerning 
responsibility became evident when held up to scrutiny by an 
appellate court. In In re Glassberg, 62 a juvenile court had also 
58 NEW YORK FAMILY COURT AcT § 712(a) (McKinney 1970) (emphasis added} .. 
59 65 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Kings County 1946). 
60 Id. at 614. 
61 Id. at 615. 
62 230 La. 395. 88 So.2d 707 (1956). 
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found a child delinquent on the basis of an accidental shooting. In 
this case, however, the Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the 
judgment and held that intent was a necessary element to establish 
the offense of delinquency. While this case ostensibly holds that 
mens rea and actus reus are required in a delinquency action, the 
decision of the juvenile court provides some evidence which shows 
the tendency to ignore these requirements in order to provide 
treatment to a child seen to be in need. 
DiMaggio and Glassberg are the only reported decisions which 
have been found which determine whether mens rea, or the voli-
tional aspect of actus reus is required in juvenile court. Further, no 
reported decisions have been found, other than cases dealing with 
infancy or insanity, in which a defense of the criminal law was 
presented which· would make the child's act excusable or justifi-
able. 63 
Although many defenses in the criminal law serve to negate the 
mental element of an offense, it is by no means certain which 
defenses a juvenile court will recognize. A juvenile court, for 
example, might be quite willing to accept the defense of ignorance 
or mistake of fact which would, in some circumstances, eliminate a 
culpable intent. If a child honestly thought that he was entering his 
grandmother's house, for instance, when in fact the child was 
entering the home of another, it would seem unlikely that any 
juvenile court would find him delinquent based on an unlawful 
entry. However no reported decisions have been found showing 
whether this defense would be available, or whether if the child 
needed some treatment, even if it were independent of this act, the 
act would still serve as a basis for a finding of delinquency. No 
reported decisions address the use of other defenses under the 
criminal law by juvenile courts, regardless of whether the defense 
arose from the mental element of the offense, or from a social 
policy, such as that involved in the case of duress. 
One unpublished opinion candidly discussed the role of mens rea 
in juvenile proceedings. In In re Betty Jean Williams, 64 the court 
held that because the purpose of the juvenile court was to provide 
treatment, the principle of mens rea was inappropriate. The court 
reasoned that mens rea was an adjunct of punishment and con-
sequently was unnecessary when punishment was not involved. 65 
Although In re Betty Jean Williams predated the Gault decision by 
63 See note 67 and accompanying text infra. 
64 Unpublished opinion, Juvenile Court for the District of Columbia. Docket No. 27-220-J 
(Oct. 20, 1959), reprinted in Westbrook, Mens Rea in the Juvenile Court 5 J. FAM. L. 121 
(1%5). 
65 The Court stated: 
Counsel's motion also states that an assessment of respondent's mental state as of 
the time of the alleged delinquency is required. This appears to involve a serious 
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almost a decade, there has been no apparent change in attitude 
since Gault. This can be seen in the manner in which courts have 
dealt with the defenses of infancy and insanity. 
Until 1970 when In re Gladys R. 66 was decided, there was 
unanimous rejection of the infancy defense by every court that 
faced the issue. 67 The Supreme Court of California, however, 
concluded that infancy was a defense to a delinquency proceed-
ing. 68 This decision, however, turned entirely upon a peculiar 
California statute,6!i and does not appear to have gained acceptance 
elsewhere. 
A similar pattern emerges when the insanity defense is consid-
ered. Although several cases have raised the issue, it is far from 
clear how extensively this defense is recognized. 70 In/n re H. C., 71 
the court held that insanity was not a bar to a finding of delin-
quency. In support of this conclusion, the court pointed out, "The 
inquiry is and must be, 'Was the act committed?' To hold insanity 
applicable as a defense to adjudicate would handcuff the court, run 
contrary to the basic theory of juvenile proceedings, and not be in 
the best interests of the juvenile himself. " 72 
Other cases have recognized insanity as a defense, but this 
position has not gained any appreciable acceptance because the 
resolution of the cases tended to turn either upon special statutes in 
that jurisdiction or upon special circumstances. 73 
misconception of the philosophy and spirit of the Juvenile Court Act .... Free 
will. evil intent, moral responsibility and proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
are the language of the criminal code. They encompass a design of punishment to 
be meted out to those who offend against the social order .... But where the 
protection rather than punishment of the offender is the aim, where the action of 
the state is on behalf of the law violator as well as in the interests of the community, 
such criminal concepts require qualification .... The more thorough-going expert 
investigation necessary to provide the trier of facts with information essential for a 
proper determination of the act alleged assumes that the question of criminal 
responsibility is at stake. It assumes that mens rea is an essential issue and that 
severe injustice would be done if the accused were punished for an act which he 
could not. of his free will, commit by reason of mental defect or disease. In the case 
at bar, neither assumption is well founded. Id. 
66 I Cal. 3d 855, 464 P.2d 127, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1970). 
67 Fox. Responsibility in the Juvenile Court, 11 WM. & MARYL. REV. 659,.667 (1970). 
68 83 Cal. Rptr. 671, 464 P.2d 127 (1970). 
69 The court found applicable to delinquency proceedings a statute which provided that all 
persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to the following classes: 
"[C]hildren under the age of fourteen in the absence of clear proof that at the time of 
committing the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness." CAL. PENAL CooE § 
26 (West 1955). This holding rested upon a questionable interpretation of legislative intent. 
See Fox, supra note 67, at 668-72. 
70 See Donovan. The Juvenile Court and the Mentally Disordered Juvenile, 45 N.D.L. 
REV. 222 (1939). Donovan points to ten instances in which the insanity defense was raised 
but does not reveal the rate of success. Id. at 233 n.33. 
71 106 N.J. Super. 583, 256 A.2d 322 (Juv. and Dom. Rel. Ct., Morris Cty. 1969). 
72 Id. at 595, 256 A.2d at 328. 
73 See. e.g .. In re Winburn, 32 Wis.2d 152, 145 N.W.2d 178 (1966), where the court found 
that juvenile court procedures authorized incarcerating juveniles for purposes other than 
treatment. 
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The problem of determ"ining the applicability of the mens rea 
doctrine and, consequently, the availablity of several defenses in 
the juvenile court is complicated by the intake procedure employed 
by the juvenile court which allows for early diversion of the chil-
dren from the system, thus, frequently precluding confrontation of 
these issues. 74 Undoubtedly, the major difficulty in assessing the 
applicabilty of mens rea is caused by the general lack of official 
reporting of juvenile cases. 75 As a result, it is unclear what the state 
of the law is in most jurisdictions, and perhaps even less clear what 
the state of the law should be. 76 
II. RESPONSIBILITY IN CLASSICAL PHILOSOPHIES 
Whether the principles of criminal responsibility which are em-
bodied in the term mens rea should apply to the juvenile court is a 
question which does not lend itself to a simple solution. Indeed, the 
use of the concept of responsibility as a valid element in adult 
criminal law has been the subject of considerable debate. 77 Lady 
Barbara Wooton is one of the leading proponents of the position 
which seeks to eliminate mens rea as a necessary element for 
societal intervention in adult cases. She has made arguments to 
abolish the principle of mens rea which in many respects sound 
much like those employed to justify the operations of the juvenile 
court. Indeed, she has proposed the model which might be seen as 
a prototype for the juvenile court. 
Lady Wooton has insisted that the whole philosophy of criminal 
responsibility is a mistake. 78 She suggests that the criminal law 
would be much more effective and more sensible if the court 
considered the state or condition of a criminal defendant's mind 
only at a dispositional state of the proceedings. That is, if it could 
be shown that the defendant did indeed kill another person, the 
state should be authorized to deal with that individual. In attempt-
ing to deal with the person, the state's primary purpose would be to 
74 See s. Fox, JUVENILE COURTS IN A NUTSHELL 151 (1971) .• 
75 See notes 64-65 and accompanying text supra. 
76 This is amply demonstrated in the debate which took place between then Judge Burger 
and Judge Bazelon in Kent v. United States, 130 U.S. App.D.C. 343,401 F.2d 408 (1968). In 
that case the question arose whether a mentally disturbed child should be civilly committed 
or proceeded against in the juvenile court. The majority, per Bazel on. concluded that civil 
commitment was the appropriate vehicle, not a delinquency action. 
77 See, e.g., Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense" - Why Not-?, 72 YALE 
L.J. 853 (1963). 
78 See B. WOOTON, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SOCIAL PATHOLOGY (1959); CRIME AND THE 
CRIMINAL LAW (1963). 
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determine whether it is likely that such an event will occur again. If 
it is, the state must devise some means of preventing such future 
behavior. Presumably, Lady Wooton would also permit the state to 
treat an individual for any other problems he might have which 
could result in future antisocial behavior, even if the problems 
were not the cause of this particular event. 
Lady Wooton's contention is that mens rea enters the criminal 
process at the wrong place. 79 She maintains that it is a useless 
practice to attempt to determine the state of the defendant's mind 
at the time of the offense. The actor's state of mind at the time of 
the offense is only relevant to the extent that it bears upon the 
likelihood of future inappropriate conduct.80 
The challenges to the principles of criminal responsibility illus-
trate that the bases of these principles must be understood to 
determine the proper ambit of the concept of responsibility and to 
ascertafo whether it should be operative in the juvenile court in a 
delinquency proceeding; Any theory of criminal responsibility 
must, of necessity, be derived from an analysis of the aims or 
purposes of the criminal law itself. Since the criminal law has 
generally employed sanctions or punishments to deal with trans-
gressors, the initial question therefore is why we punish. It is only 
after this has been decided that we can determine whom society 
may legitimately punish. At the heart of the question of who may 
be punished is the concept of responsibility. Several writers have 
addressed these questions and it will be helpful, therefore, to 
examine and consider the implications of their diverse philosophi-
c_al theories. 
The first group is discussed under the heading. of a "better 
person" theory. The second includes both the classical and mod-
em utilitarian philosophy. Both of these groups find a justification 
for punishment in the ends which are served by it. In this sense the 
philosophies are teleological, (oriented toward ends or purposes). 
The third group differs significantly from the first two and is con-
sidered under the heading of retribution. The discussion is not 
intended as a full exposition of these schools of thought, but rather 
79 8. WOOTON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 52 (1963). 
so Lady Wooton has written: 
If the object of the criminal law is to prevent the occurrence of socially damaging 
actions. it would be absurd to tum a blind eye to those which were due to 
carelessness, negligence or even accident. The question of motivation is iq the first 
instance irrelevant. 
But only in the first instance. At a later stage, that is to say, after what is now 
known as a conviction, the presence or absence of guilty intention is all-important 
for its effect on the appropriate measures to be taken to prevent a recurrence of the 
forbidden act. The prevention of accidental deaths presents different problems 
from those involved in the prevention of wilful murders. 
Id. at 52-53. 
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as a method to simply isolate certain principles against which the 
concept of responsibility can be examined. 
A. Better Person Theory 
The frame of reference for the first group of teleological 
philosophers is that of the individual himself. Plato saw crime as 
being closely analogous to sickness and believed that an individual 
could be cured only through punishment. 81 Ideas similar to this can 
be found in the writings of Aristotle82 and Hegel. 83 The central 
theme is that punishment operates to make an individual a better 
person. The objective is not to coerce the wrongdoer into simply 
avoiding certain kinds of behavior, but to drive home to him the 
moral implications of the conduct, thereby making the person more 
moral. 
As noble as such an ambition might be in the sphere of private 
ethics, there is room for some substantial reservations about allow-
ing such a philosophy to serve as a societal justification for the 
practice of punishment. 84 The real issue is whether the purpose of 
the criminal law, and perhaps even law in general, is to make 
people morally upright or merely to stop them from engaging in 
certain kinds of activity. The "better person" theorists seem to 
subscribe to the former objective, while as a society, we seem 
more inclined to the latter. Although society hopes that an indi-
vidual will recognize the moral implications of his actions, it ap-
pears that the major concern is with outwardly directed behavior. 
B. Utilitarian Theories 
In contrast to those who saw punishment as serving a useful 
purpose for the individual, a second group of writers justify 
punishment on the basis of the good it achieves for society at large. 
Within this school of thought, known as utilitarianism, there are 
several different sub-groups which seek to justify punishment with 
an eye toward the same general objective but which proceed from 
differing basic assumptions. For example, one may proceed on the 
81 PLATO, GoRGIAS, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO (E. Hamilton & H. Cairns 
ed. 1961). 
82 ARISTOTLE, NrcHOMACf-!EAN ETHICS, bk. III, ch. 5. 
83 See McTaggart, Hegel's Theory of Punishment, 6 INT'L. J. ETHICS 482-99 (1896), 
partially reprinted in G. EZ0RSKY, PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 40 
(1971). 
84 Of course there may be some doubt that either Plato or Aristotle offered it as a societal 
justification. It is helpful, however, if a perspective on the problem can be maintained. That 
is, even if one does not subscribe fully to their system of private ethics, there are points 
relevant to our discussion which are nt,vertheless applicable. 
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basis of a view of man which is highly rationalistic. A second may 
adopt a totally deterministic perspective. And yet a third might 
argue that both rationality and determinism play important parts. 
Despite these differences, all find a justification for punishment in 
the useful purposes it serves for society. For this reason they are 
discussed together. 
The classical utilitarian theory finds its most forceful expression 
in the writings of Jeremy Bentham. His theory of punishment may 
be seen as a narrower aspect of a much larger general theory of 
ethics. 85 In terms of governmental operation, Bentham and other 
classical utilitarians seek to promote the greatest good for the 
greatest number, or conversely to reduce the greatest amount of 
suffering for the greatest number.86 The criminal law, and hence 
punishment, are devices which may be employed to accomplish 
this end. 87 
The classical utilitarian theory of punishment relies upon a view 
of humanity in which reason will always dictate the course of 
action. In contrast, more recent writers, such as B. F. Skinner88 
and Karl Menninger,89 have argued that behavior often results 
from previous conditioning, disease, or other external causes quite 
independent of the faculty of reason. It is much more enlightening 
to examine the specific means through which utilitarians achieve 
their objectives, rather than simply to discuss the philosophies in a 
vacuum. 
1. Incapacitation - The simplest and most obvious means of 
preventing the commission of an offense is through the use of 
physical restraint. So long as a person is confined, there will be 
little likelihood of his committing any crimes against society at 
large. There may, therefore, be instances in which an individual is 
so likely to commit serious offenses that the only means of dealing 
85 As stated by Bentham: 
By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of 
every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to 
augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in questi~n: or, 
what is the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say 
of every action whatsoever; and therefore not only of every action of a private 
individual, but of every measure of government. 
J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, chp. I, 
§ II, reprinted in THE UTILITARIANS 73 (Doubleday ed. 1961). 
86 See, e.g., G. ·E. MOORE, ETHICS I (1912). 
87 In Bentham's words: 
The business of government is to promote the happiness of the society by punishing 
and rewarding. That part of its business which consists in punishing is more 
particularly the subject of penal law. In proportion as an act tends to disturb that 
happiness, in proportion as the tendency of it ·is pernicious, will be the demand it 
creates for punishment. 
BENTHAM, supra note 85. 
88 B. F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (1971). 
89 K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT (1966). 
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with him is by permanent incarceration. In the case of a 
psychopathic killer, for example, the only effective means of pre-
venting future deaths 'may be indefinite confinement. 90 
Undoubtedly, other factors beyond merely restraining an indi-
vidual are involved in considering the purposes of the criminal law. 
It is important to note at this point, however, that even in a system 
of juvenile justice, it may be necessary to resort to this idea on 
occasion. This fact was recognized by the President's Commission 
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. 91 It is impor-
tant to consider how compatible such a theory is with a philosophy 
which seeks only to serve the best interest of a child. 
2. Deterrence-The idea of deterrence is central to the purpose 
of preventing criminal actions in a utilitarian philosophy. Classical 
utilitarians argue that either the threat or the actual imposition of 
punishment will inhibit most of the members of society from engag-
ing in criminal activity. Two different types of deterrence can be 
achieved by the threat or imposition of punishment and are gener-
ally referred to as special and general deterrence. 
a. Special Deterrence- In the classical theory utilitarians 
relied upon a hedonistic pleasure-pain model in which an individual 
would calculate the "cost" of the crime. If the individual were 
forced by the government to realize that the pain or "cost" of the 
crime, namely the punishment, was not worth the pleasure or 
benefit of the crime, then presumably she would cease engaging in 
that conduct.92 
A number of criticisms have been raised regarding the practice of 
special deterrence.93 The first line of criticism derives from the 
empirical studies which have been done on recidivism rates among 
offenders, and which indicate that the theories do not hold up in 
practice. 94 Studies which have attempted to evaluate the perform-
90 The death penalty is certainly the most complete form of incapacitation. Professor 
Packer has observed that if a society were "simple-mindedly devoted to the repression of 
crime as a paramount objective of social life. incapacitation would be the most immediately 
plausible utilitarian justification for the punishment of offenders." H. PACKER, THE LIMITS 
OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 48 (1968). 
91 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 44, at 9. 
92 BENTHAM, supra note 85, at chs. 12-15. Although not properly part of the classical 
theory, the much more popular notion today of treatment, which is of course at the heart of 
juvenile justice, may, from society's point of view, achieve the same end. Under the 
classical view of special deterrence, an individual would be frightened away from engaging 
in the proscribed behavior because he is painfully aware of the cost. Under a treatment 
theory, presumably, the individual would lose his inclination to act in that manner because 
the original disorder which caused the behavior has been rectified. Nevertheless, in both 
instances there is a concern that the individual not engage in future antisocial acts. See, e.g., 
Lehman, Medical Model of Treatment, 18 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 204 (1972). 
93 See H. PACKER, supra note 90, at 46. 
94 Professor Packer has pointed out that: 
Although there is much disagreement over specific figures and even more over 
their significance, it is universally recognized that persons who have served prison 
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ance of juvenile institutions have also cast doubt upon their effec-
.tiveness.95 However, there is a variety of reasons which may 
account for high recidivism rates other than simply the failure of 
special deterrence. 96 
Further, in most instances special deterrence is not the only 
justification for the practice of punishment. Even in the classical 
utilitarian philosophy several other reasons justify the imposition 
of punishment.97 If special deterrence offers some additional sub-
benefit to these other theories, that can only be a factor in its favor. 
Moreover, if the goal of rehabilitation or treatment is part of or an 
ally of the theory of special deterrence, the fault may be with the 
present inability to provide effective treatment rather than-with the 
theory which indicates that it ought to be provided. 98 We must 
inquire whether our inability to provide treatment discredits any 
justification predicated upon it. Such a consideration is of 
paramount concern to a justification of juvenile court practice, 
where the sole objective, theoretically, is to do what is in the best 
interest of the child. If treatment cannot be supplied, it follows that 
any intervention by the juvenile court which is premised exclu-
sively on treatment is unjustifiable. 
A second objection to the idea of special deterrence is the extent 
to which a utilitarian might go in order to accomplish it. In a 
classical Benthamite model, punishment is viewed as an evil, and 
only that amount of punishment which will make the pain slightly 
greater than the pleasure of the offense is justified. 99 
If a relatively trivial offense could be deterred only by a rather 
harsh punishment, and if no greater damage would be done to 
sentences have a high rate of reconviction, perhaps as inuch as fifty percent. 
Superficially, this well-documented fact does appear to raise substantial questions 
about the efficacy of special deterrence. 
Id. Most of the studies have concluded that the actual effects of punitive measures do not 
live up to the theory of special deterrence. When the focus is shifted to treatment type 
programs, it may be that the practice does not live up to the theory. See, G. HUGHES, 
SOCIAL JUSTICE 215 (1968); W. ELDRIDGE, NARCOTICS AND THE LAW 154 (2d ed. 1967). 
95 See Lerman, Evaluative Studies of Institutions for Delinquents, reprinted in DELIN-
QUENCY AND SOCIAL POLICY, at 236-49 (P. Lerman ed. 1970). 
96 Professor Packer has identified several factors which should be considered. They 
include the character of the individuals. the types of offenses, and the severity of the 
punishment. H. PACKER, supra note 90, at 46. 
91 See note 103 and accompanying text infra. 
98 See note 95 supra. 
99 The punishment should be only that which is absolutely necessary. 
Every punishment which does not arise from absolute necessity, says the great 
Montesquieu, is tyrannical. A Proposition which may be made more general, thus. 
Every act of authority of one man over another, for which there is not an absolute 
necessity, is tyrannical. It is upon this then, that the sovereign's right to punish 
crimes is founded: that is, upon the necessity of defending the public liberty, 
entrusted to his care, from the usurpation of individuals; and punishments are just 
in proportion, as the liberty preserved by the sovereign, is sacred and valuable. 
C. BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 165 (London ed. 1775). 
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society by punishing the offender rather than not punishing him, 
would it be justifiable? Although Bentham provides certain stan-
dards regarding the degree of punishment which may be imposed, it 
is not at all certain that they resolve this question. 100 
Indeed, it seems that a true utilitarian position requires approval 
of a harsh punishment if it is the only means of eliminating the 
,conduct which society has determined must be eliminated. This 
problem is updated and complicated further by the proposal regard-
ing penal reform made by Dr. Karl Menninger to the American Bar 
Association. After outlining a variety of proposals, Dr. Menninger 
stated: 
[A psychiatric perspective] entails certain radical changes in 
penal practice including (a) substitution of the idea of treat-
ment, painful or otherwise, for the idea of retributive punish-
ment, (b) the release of prisoners upon discharge or parole only 
after complete and competent psychiatric examination with 
findings favorable for successful rehabilitation, to which end 
the desirability ofresident psychiatrists in all penal institutions 
is obvious, (c) the permanent legal detention of the incurably 
inadequate, incompetent and anti-social, irrespective of the 
particular offense committed, (d) the use of this "permanently 
custodial group" for the advantage of the State - to earn their 
keep.101 
With the exception of the permanent custodial aspect of this 
statement, it seems that Menninger's proposal could be substituted 
for the working plan of most juvenile courts today. The question 
which is merely raised at this point is whether ''treatment, painful 
or otherwise," is justified "irrespective of the particular offense." 
Would, for example, the making of an obscene phone call justify 
"treatment" for a possible six-year period? 102 
b. General Deterrence- The utilitarian idea of general deter-
rence is predicated upon the value of a threat as a means of social 
control. Criminal legislation is seen as an announcement to society 
that certain actions are not allowed. Through this announcement 
and through the accompanying threat which sets forth the conse-
quences which will befall an individual who engages in this con-
duct, society attempts to insure that fewer of these acts will take 
JOO See E. PINCOFFS, THE RATIONALE OF LEGAL PUNISHMENT 81-94 (1%6). 
101 Menninger, The Psychatrist in Relation to Crime 51 A.B.A. REP. 751, 757 (1926) 
(emphasis <idded). 
102 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1%7). This discussion leads to the question of proportion-
ality between crime and punishment. Although this is intimately related to a sense of justice, 
it is somewhat beyond the scope of this article. It does, nevertheless, raise interesting 
problems which should be explored. 
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place. 103 To a large extent the effectiveness of such an endeavor 
depends upon the members of the community performing an arith-
metic evaluation of pain versus pleasure; if the cost outweighs the 
benefit to be derived from crime, then, presumably, individuals 
will not pursue criminal behavior. 104 
Critics argue, however, th~t such theories, which rely upon 
rational calculation, are based on a shallow psychological 
model, 105 and that in reality members of society are driven largely 
by unconscious motives, acting without reflection upon the ra-
tional principles of the pleasure-pain formula. Although there is a 
great deal of validity to the claim that the classical utilitarian model 
does not give a complete picture of human nature, perhaps the 
psychological critics of that model have not given a complete 
picture either. 106 It is quite possible that both rational and uncon-
scious motives exist in most human conduct. 
The question which naturally arises in the context of general 
deterrence is to what extent would there be violation of the law if 
the threats of criminal sanctions were removed. In the majority of 
cases people might refrain from the commission of crimes on moral 
grounds quite independent of any threats of penalty. However, the 
criminal law itself may provide a valuable stimulus to the socializa-
tion process through which patterns of behavior are formed. 
Through these processes the law may illuminate moral considera-
tions and subconsciously and consciously reinforce decisions re-
garding moral conduct in the same way that other institutions of 
society, such as the family, the school, the church, and the com-
103 See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 6 (1968). 
104 Much has been written regarding the certainty of apprehension as a factor which can 
determine whether an individual engages in criminal conduct. Obviously, this is another 
factor which may be necessary to insert in the pleasure-pain formula. It does not, of course, 
deny the validity of the theory itself. See, e.g., H. PACKER, supra note 90, at 40-41; Michael 
& Wechsler, supra note 21, at 1264-70. 
105 See J. ELLINGSTON, PROTECTING OUR CHILDREN FROM CRIMINAL CAREERS 43 
(1948), quoted in Ball, The Deterrence Concept in Criminology and Law, 46 J. CRIM. L. C. 
& P.S. 347, 351 (1955). 
106 Professor Packer has illustrated the problems involved in the following way: 
The psychological critics reject the reality of [the Benthamite model]. In doing so, 
they substitute for it a model of man as governed by largely ·unconscious drives 
.... The psychological model, if I may call it that, represents the criminal as 
murderer - and not as murderer for profit but as perpetrator of the crime of 
passion. He is the man who kills on impulse because he hates his father, he is 
sexually inadequate, he lacks control, and so forth .... The Benthamite model 
may well be a more nearly accurate representation of the acquisitive criminal; the 
burglar, the embezzler, the con man. Perhaps the purest modem instance is the 
man who cheats on his income tax. 
H. PACKER, supra note 90, at 41. To expand upon Professor Packer's point, it must also be 
quite obvious that once one chooses the model of an individual who has broken the law, the 
majority of society has been excluded from consideration. The validity or effectiveness of 
the theory of general deterrence is, therefore, not necessarily discredited by pointing to 
those for whom it has not accomplished its purpose since it may. have operated effectively in 
the majority of cases. 
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munity, do. 107 Further, although there have been few instances 
from which empirical conclusions can be drawn regarding this 
question, those few occasions in which threats of criminal sanc-
tions have been removed seem to indicate that moral convictions 
alone do not suffice to keep the crime rate down. One example 
occurred in 1919 when the Liverpool police force went on strike. 
The following official report was made: 
[T]he strike was accompanied by threats, violence and intimi-
dation on the part of lawless persons. Many assaults on the 
constables who remained on duty were committed. Owing to 
the sudden nature of the strike the authorities were afforded no 
opportunity to make adequate provision to cope with the situa-
tion. Looting of shops commenced about IO p.m. on August 
1st, and continued for some days. In all about 400 shops were 
looted. Military were requisitioned, special constables sworn 
in, and police brought in from other centers. 108 
Although many authorities support the theories of general de-
terrence, there has been great reluctance on the part of the juvenile 
court even to acknowledge an acquaintanceship with it. 109 There 
would perhaps be grounds for a charge of philosophical inconsis-
tency if a system which asserted as its sole concern the best 
interest of a child were found to be engaged in an attempt at 
intimidating others by punishing a child when her "best interests" 
would not counsel it. It should be recognized, however, that even if 
the focus remained solely on the child, the manner in which a child, 
or many children, are treated by the court filters back to the 
community and generates general deterrence as a byproduct. 110 
Few would seriously suggest that a child ought to be punished 
simply to deter others from engaging in a particular sort of be-
havior. This thought, however, raises a fundamental question in 
107 See ·H.L.A. }!ART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 23-23, 168-69, 175-76 (1961). 
108 H. MANNHEIM, SOCIAL ASPECTS OF CRIME IN ENGLAND BETWEEN THE WARS 156-57 
(1940). Denmark experienced a similar situation in 1944 when German forces arrested the 
entire police force. 
During the remainder of the occupation period all policing was performed by an 
improvised unarmed watch corps, who were ineffective except in those instances 
when they were able to capture the criminal red handed. The general crime rate 
rose immediately, but there was a great discrepancy between the various types of 
crime .... Unfortunately, none of the reports tells us whether the rise in criminal-
ity was due to increased activity among established criminals or whether non-
criminals participated as well. 
Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, I 14 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 961-62 
(1966). 
109 See Fox, Philosophy and the Principles of Punishment in the Juvenile Court, 8 FAM. 
L. Q. 373, 383-84 (1974). 
11° Conversely if no deterrence is perceived it will be reflected in the community. See 
Morgan, They think"/ can kill because I'm 14," N.Y. Times, Jan. 19; 1975, Magazine, at !1. 
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terms of the utilitarian philosophy, namely who may be punished? 
The standard utilitarian answer to the question is: only an offender 
who has broken the law. 111 While such an answer sounds very 
much like the retributionist response, 112 it could also be justified on 
totally utilitarian grounds. 113 
Nevertheless, a number of writers have expressed suspicion of 
the utilitarian limitations on the question of who may be punished 
as well as on the question of the extent to which an individual may 
be punished. 114 The major criticism is that a utilitarian philosophy 
would seem to justify the punishment of an innocent person, if 
other crimes could be averted by such punishment. In this respect, 
therefore, utilitarianism may not be capable of fully answering the 
question of who may be punished in terms that are entirely accept-
able. There can be little doubt that for a government to embark 
upon a practice of punishing innocent people, or even to do it in 
only one instance, smacks of injustice. It may be that an explana-
tion of the moral notions inherent in this sense of injustice must be 
sought outside the utilitarian framework. 
C. Retribu tivist Theory 
The classical theory of retribution states that punishment pos-
sesses intrinsic worth in and of itself. In this sytem the punishment 
of an individual is not justified on the basis of some ulterior pur-
pose, such as deterrence or reformation, but rather on the theory 
that punishment of the deserving is alone a good which goes far 
beyond society or the individual offender. 115 Most retributivist 
111 This is directly connected with the theory which would justify society's determination 
of what conduct should be proscribed. See J. S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (1857). 
112 See note 116 and accompanying text infra. 
113 It could be argued that if the individual has not violated the law then no special 
deterrent end would be served. Further, it might be contended that punishing innocent 
persons would be destructive of social good unless the fact of their innocence was kept 
totally secret. Finally, a utilitarian might suggest that by punishing only those persons who 
have violated the law precious social interests, such as predictability of the consequences of 
one's actions and general social stability. are promoted. For a discussion of some of the 
social values involved. see L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW, 33-91 (1%4). Although 
Fuller is discussing something quite different from the concept of responsibility, his argu-
ments set forth many excellent positions for the utilitarians. 
114 See, e.g., Greenawalt. "Uncontrollable" Actions and the Eighth Amendment: Impli-
cations of Powell v. Texas, 69 CoLUM. L. REV. 927, 939 (1969). 
115 This idea has been stated as follows: 
Punishment is the denial of wrong by the assertion of right. and the wrong exists in 
the self. or will. of the criminal; his self is a wrongful self. and is realized in his 
person and possessions; he has asserted in them his wrongful will. the incarnate 
denial of right; and in denying that assertion, and annihilating. whether wholly or 
partially. that incarnation by fine. or imprisonment. or even by death, we annihilate 
the wrong and manifest the right; and since this. as we saw. was an end in itself. so 
punishmnent is also an end in itself. 
F. H. BRADLEY, ETHICAL STUDIES, THE VULGAR NOTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY 27-28 
(1927). 
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theories find their support in the writings of Immanuel Kant. Kant 
maintained that the only proper justification for punishing a person 
is that a crime has been committed. 116 Crime in this sense means 
the unlawful act of a free and responsible agent. Second, the only 
manner and degree of punishment is that which is equal to the 
crime. 117 These propositions must be understood together; 
through them Kant set out the conditions precedent of punishment, 
and the degree of punishment that is justifiable. Kant would permit 
the use of punishment as a means of reformation of an individual 
after these specified conditions have been met, but such a purpose 
would not ab initio justify punishment. 118 It is important that 
punishment be perceived not as the product of some questionable 
purpose which results from a choice on the part of society, but 
rather as a result of the criminal's own choice. 119 A person must, 
therefore, never be treated merely as a means to some other end; 
the person must be the end. 
Retributivists see the criminal as acting in accordance with a 
wrong maxim, which if universalized would destroy freedom. 120 
By punishing, a society is pointing out the wrongfulness of the 
maxim. At all times, however, the focus is on the individual's 
freedom. 
A pure retributive system would involve the adopting of the 
maxim acted upon by the criminal and the turning of it on him. 
Since he has claimed that the maxim can be universalized, he 
warrants treatment in accordance with the maxim. Thus, if he has 
taken the property of others, then his property should be taken, 
and so forth. What we do to the criminal is simply to accept him on 
his own terms. 121 To embark upon a program of inflicting useless 
suffering because it is "deserved," however, would not seem to be 
the most noble endeavor a civilized nation could engage in. It 
should be apparent that avoiding this end was one of the major 
concerns of the early reformers and the later proponents of the 
juvenile justice system. Perhaps with their predominant concern 
over the retributivist mandates of who must be punished, the 
reformers sacrificed some important precepts as to who may be 
punished when they discarded the retributionist theory. 
116 I. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, Pt. II. 195-98 (Wiltastive trans. 1887). 
"' Id. 
118 See E. PINCOFFS supra note JOO, at 15. 
11
• Id. at 8. 
120 Id. at 9. 
121 Id. 
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A. The Role of Responsibility in the 
Juvenile Court 
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A remarkable feature of the entire system of juvenile justice is 
that, unlike the criminal law, the juvenile system goes about its 
business with an avowed single-mindedness. A single principle has 
charted the direction of the juvenile court; almost all disputes 
which have arisen in this area have been resolved by resort to the 
philosophy of doing what is in the best interests of the child. 
Indeed, we might question whether this "philosophy" is even a 
philosophy in traditional jurisprudential terms. It might be more 
accurate to say that it is no more than "a statement of benign 
motives of judges or corrections administrators, or ... a declara-
tion of legislative intent behind the enactment of juvenile legisla-
tion." 122 
It should be evident that the objectives of the juvenile court, 
when viewed in terms of the classical philosophies, arise from 
teleological considerations. The concern for doing that which is in 
the best interest of the child can be analyzed as deriving from 
certain aspects of the theories of both the utilitarian and "better 
person" philosophies. Although juvenile courts have clearly de-
parted from classical utilitarianism, as illustrated by their reluc-
tance to acknowledge general deterrence as a justification for the 
disposition of a child,123 the concern with education, treatment, 
and rehabilitation, however, can be seen as updated versions of 
both the "better man" and utilitarian ideas. 124 Neither substantial 
documentation nor extensive analysis is required to demonstrate 
that the juvenile court in theory attempts through its dispositions to 
promote the greatest "happiness" for both the child and society. 
The retributivist notion of punishment as a just dessert is com-
pletely lacking from the general aims of juvenile justice. Indeed, 
the entire child-saving movement can be characterized as a rejec-
tion of a jurisprudence of guilt and blameworthiness and an adop-
tion of one ofreformation. 125 While guilt and blameworthiness may 
122 Fox, Philosophy and the Principles of Punishment in the Juvenile Court, 8 FAM. L. Q. 
373, 379 (I 974). 
123 See note 103 and accompanying text supra. 
124 The teleological origins are even more apparent when one moves from a consideration 
of delinquency to an examination of the categories of "unruly" or "persons in need of 
supervision." In these instances, conduct such as truancy, use of alcohol or tobacco. etc. 
serves to illustrate the types of concern involved. 
125 See Fox, supra note 122. at 377. The whole movement toward juvenile reform may 
also be seen in the trends in the general sphere of corrections. See D. ROTHMAN, THE 
DISCOVERY OF. THE ASYLUM 130-54 (1971). 
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still be important concepts in any plan for rehabilitation or treat-
ment, it is clear that in the context of juvenile justice they derive 
from a teleological origin. 126 The Kantian mandate that transgres-
sors must be punished has no support in the philosophy of juvenile 
justice. 127 
The abandonment of retributivist theories has had a direct corre-
lation with the diminishing significance attached to the criminal law 
concept of responsibility in juvenile law. As juvenile courts substi-
tuted the idea of treatment for punishment, they showed a pro-
gressive concern for obtaining jurisdiction over any child for whom 
they felt treatment would be beneficial. While the conduct of the 
child that would trigger societal intervention continued to be de-
fined in terms of the acts proscribed by the criminal law, less and 
less attention w~s paid to the mental elements of those crimes. 
One of the easiest areas into which the courts could extend and 
justify their jurisdiction on the basis of treatment was the insanity 
defense'. If a child was sick and not responsible for her actions, 
there was all the more reason for the court to intercede, since the 
whole purpose for the existence of a separate juvenile justice 
system was to provide assistance to children in need .128 This was 
an understandable development, particularly in light of the appa-
rent disenchantment in some quarters with the insanity defense in 
the adult criminal law .129 If the defense of insanity were the only 
aspect of the concept ofresponsibility to be discarded as a result of 
the treatment philosophy, the departure from common law princi-
ples would not be too great. The juvenile court's preoccupation 
with treatment objectives, however, has had a similar effect in 
other areas. 
While reported cases are scarce, Frederick Wiseman provided 
evidence of the extent of the impact of the treatment philosophy 
upon another traditional common law defense, in a 1971 cinema 
verite documentary entitled Juvenile Court. The film followed the 
actual operation of a juvenile court in Memphis, Tennessee 
through a series of cases that came before it. In one case a child 
was adjudged delinquent in spite of the judge's concession that 
126 Whether such concepts as guilt and blameworthiness are really helpful aids to rehabili-
tation is more a psychiatric or psychological question than one of jurisprudence. 
127 But see, They Think, "/ can kill because I'm /4," supra note I IO. Revenge is also 
something that may have to be taken into account. See H.M. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal 
Law, 23 L. & CoNTEMP. PROB. 401 (1958). It should be noted that there has been a good deal 
of disenchantment with this particular retributive idea throughout the entire system of 
criminal law. See, e.g., J. MITFORD, KIND AND USUAL PUNISHMENT (1971). 
128 State ex rel. H. C., 106 N.J. Super. 583,256 A.2d 322. (Juv. and Dom. Rel. Ct., Morris 
County 1969). 
129 See, e.g., Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"-Why not?, 72 YALE L. 
J. 853 (1963). 
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self-defense was probably established. 130 While recognizing that 
self-defense was involved, the judge concluded that other factors 
indicated that the youth needed help. 131 As a result, a child, whose 
actions would probably have been justifiable in terms of the crimi-
nal law, was committed to the youth authorities of Tennessee as a 
delinquent. 
A similar line of reasoning to support a child's commitment for 
treatment could easily be constructed to justify the abolition of 
other defenses, such as ignorance or mistake. In terms of the 
juvenile court philosophy, the court might envision that a child 
needs treatment to make him aware of his misapprehension of 
certain facts, even though such misapprehension would ordinarily 
exculpate the child from criminal liability. Indeed, in one such case 
mens rea, or the intent to commit the act itself, was considered 
irrelevant. 132 
Thus, while juvenile justice has adopted an objective which 
derives from utilitarian considerations, in some instances there has 
been a marked departure from the traditional utilitarian limitations 
embodied in the concept of responsibility which are placed upon 
this objective. Both classical and modern utilitarians have seen 
mens rea as a device through which other values that are vitally 
important to society are respected. These include, among other 
things, the predictability of the consequences of one's actions, 
social stability, and, perhaps most importantly, principles of free-
dom and liberty. Within the utilitarian framework, a primary en-
deavor is to prevent the occurrence of criminal acts. It has been 
recognized that this objective can succeed only in cases in which 
the individual understands what he is doing and can feel the signifi-
cance of the sanction imposed upon violators. 133 It is unlikely, 
therefore, that society could deter an individual who either did not 
intend to do the act or who did not appreciate the wrongfulness of 
the act. In addition, it does little good for individuals in positions 
similar to that of the actor to see the actor punished for something 
he did not intend to do. Official intervention under these cir-
cumstances could lead to a perception of the entire system as 
dependent on the capriciousness of fate. If it is impossible for a 
person to avoid the sanction, the integrity of the legal system 
130 The facts of the case were not clearly presented in the film, but apparently the child 
had used the family gun to defend himself against an aggressor who entered his family's 
home. 
131 These other factors were not specified in the film, although the judge did display some 
displeasure with the fact that the parents had left the gun in a place accessible to the youth. 
132 See notes 64-65 and accompanying text supra. 
134 See A. GoLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 12-15 (1967). 
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suffers and may lead inevitably to a total denial of individual 
freedom. 
In utilitarian terms, therefore, the doctrine of mens rea can be 
seen as the vehicle through which other values are respected. 
However, in a utilitarian philosophy freedom may simply be one 
value to be considered along with many others. Thus, freedom 
could become a relativistic idea that could be compromised when 
balanced against other values. For example, compromise has oc-
curred in the criminal law where liability is strict or absolute. Here 
the relatively slight penalty, even for an unintentional violation 
such as a minor traffic offense, is offset by the danger from the 
conduct and injury that could result to society. It must be recog-
nized that a valuable ideal has been sacrificed to the public good. 134 
While strict liability offenses may not present any great danger to 
the general ideal of freedom, it is at this point that one also encoun-
ters the dilemma of punishing the innocent to achieve some other 
good, such as general deterrence. 135 
By contrast, the retributivist places the same limitations upon 
governmental activity but in a way that is independent of social 
purposes. The only condition upon which a theory of retribution 
would permit coercive societal intervention is that the individual 
had been convicted of a crime that was the product of his will. 136 In 
a retributivist view, regardless of the beneficial consequences 
which could be achieved, only after a conviction is society justified 
in interfering with an individual's liberty or property. To do other-
wise is to deny the values of freedom and humanity137 and to treat 
an individual merely as a means and not as an end. 138 
When the early juvenile justice theorists rejected the retributivist 
philosophy as an aim of the juvenile court, it appears that they and 
those that have followed them also felt compelled to reject the 
limitations which that philosophy places upon governmental inter-
vention.139 However, they failed to realize that retribution could be 
denied as an aim 9f the juvenile court while still accepting the 
limitations articulated therein. 140 As in the utilitarian philosophy, 
134 See H.L.A. HART, supra note 25, at 4-10. 
1 35 See note 114 and accompanying text supra. 
136 See E. PINCOFFS, supra note 100, at 81-94. The retributivist philosophy would also 
permit societal intervention for the mentally ill for two reasons. First, the individual is not a 
free rational being and therefore is not morally responsible. Secondly, generally the re-
quirement that the individual is dangerous to himself or others must be demonstrated. The 
combination of these two factors would justify the intervention. 
137 See C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment. 6 RES JuorcATAE 224 
(1953). 
138 
/. Kant, supra note 116, at 195-98. 
139 See note 37 and accompanying text supra. 
140 That is, as a principle of distribution. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 25. Of course, it 
might be suggested that theorists knew precisely what they were doing and were thereby 
able to expand governmental authority into previously circumscribed areas. 
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the concept of freedom which prohibits overzealous governmental 
intervention is at the heart of the retributivist limitation. The effect, 
therefore, of a complete rejection of retribution has been a signifi-
cant dilution of the principle of freedom. 
In our society freedom has always been and is today highly 
valued. 141 Yet, acknowledgement of this fact does not require an 
abandonment of teleological objectives but rather recognition that 
both philosophies represent important values. A teleological ap-
proach demands that any governmental intervention be designed to 
serve useful purposes while the principles of retribution protect an 
individual's freedom. Jointly, therefore, these two philosophies 
provide rules of exclusion which determine whether governmental 
action is justifiable. Accordingly, intervention should be confined 
to those instances in which both theories argue that it is justified. In 
other words, if we view the justifications offered by both 
philosophies as intersecting circles, intervention should be justified 
only in cases which come within the area that is mutually shared. 
Governmental action is therefore justifiable only against those 
persons who have committed an offense and for whom such action 
would serve a useful purpose. 
While it is not always easy to ascertain the objectives sought by 
the adult criminal process, because of other conflicting values, 142 
the problem need not be as difficult in the juvenile court, which has 
already recognized a primary social purpose limitation. The Uni-
form Juvenile Court Act defines a delinquent child as one "who 
has committed a delinquent act and is in need of treatment or 
rehabilitation." 143 All that would be necessary, therefore, to out-
line the objectives of the juvenile justice system is the additional 
recognition of the standard derived from principles of freedom and 
liberty, and established by the concept of responsibility. These are 
not only part of a metaphysical philosophy but are the fundamental 
underpinnings of our entire society. 
141 It has been pointed out that: 
In modern times. the doctrine of inviolable rights and fundamental liberties of the 
individual and social groups - as freedom of religion. liberty of thought, respect 
for human dignity aside from every racial discrimination. etc. - has clearly 
confirmed the view that law is limited by principles of moral order. Indeed. such 
principles are often regarded as the very foundation of legal order. and therefore 
represent the basic criteria of its interpretation. 
S. Cotta D .. Law Between Ethics and Politics, in THE LIMITS OF LAW, Nomos XV 90 
(1974). 
142 A simple instance of conflict might exist. for example, between the theories of special 
and general deterrence. It is easy to imagine a situation where in order to serve the ends of 
general deterrence ideas of special deterrence are abandoned. In addition, it is difficult to 
gauge just how prominent ideas such as revenge are in the criminal law. These cir-
cumstances might, therefore. complicate the use of this model for adults. 
143 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM 
JUVENILE COURT ACT § 2(3) (1968). 
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The issue which must now be faced is whether there are signif-
icant differences between children and adults; and if so, whether 
this leads to the conclusion that the doctrine of mens rea is inap-
propriate in juvenile proceedings. 
B. Punishment v. Treatment 
A problem which might be encountered when urging that the 
juvenile court recognize the concept of responsibility arises from 
the suggestion that the concept of responsibility in both utilitarian 
and retributive philosophies derives from a rationale of punish-
ment. The juvenile court is presumably not concerned with 
punishment but rather with assistance and treatment. 144 The ques-
tion, therefore, is whether a treatment philosophy suggests that 
mens rea should be eliminated. It would be tempting to simply say 
that the juvenile justice system is in fact punishing children under 
the guise of treatment. The President's Commission on Law En-
forcement and Administration of Justice, 145 as well as some of the 
reported decisions 146 provide ample evidence of the punitive na-
ture of many juvenile institutions. This evidence, however force-
ful, does not completely meet the objection to using the concept of 
responsibility. By contrasting the processes of the adult criminal 
law with those of the juvenile justice system, however, the parallel 
between the adult's punishment and the juvenile's treatment can be 
seen. 
To begin with, the behavior which results in a finding of delin-
quency is defined in terms of the criminal code. 147 The apprehen-
sion through which a juvenile is called to the system's attention is 
accomplished almost exclusively by the police. 148 The determina-
tion of whether the child engaged in the proscribed activity is 
conducted before a judicial tribunal, and proof of identification of 
the youth who committed the act must be made beyond a reason-
able doubt. 149 Moreover, the dispositional alternatives available to 
the juvenile court include_ probation and commitment to juvenile 
144 The National Council of Juve.nile Judges expressed the basic premise of juvenile court 
jurisdiction. "Children are different from adults and deserve not only due process protection 
but also the benefit of individualized dispositions based on the needs of the child .... " 
Resolution of the National Council of Juvenile Judges, (July 11, 1974), reprinted in Fox, 
Philosophy and the Principles of Punishment in the Jul'enile Court, 8 FAM. L.Q. 373 (1974). 
See also Mack, supra note 38. 
145 PRESIDENT"S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF Jus-
TICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 141-54 (1967). 
146 See, e.g., Lollis v. New York State Dep't of Social Servs., 322 F.Supp. 473 (S.D.N. Y. 
1970). 
147 Such a provision is found in almost every juvenile court act. See note 42 supra. 
148 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 11-14 (1967). 
149 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
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institutions, which are frequently highly penal. 150 Most of the 
"treatment" personnel see themselves as operating within a cor-
rectional system. 151 In addition, a stigma attaches to a delinquent 
in a manner similar to an adult criminal. 152 
In discussing the treatment-punishment dichotomy, it must be 
recognized that a semaritic digression has been encountered. If 
what one has in mind as punishment involves the rack and the 
wheel, then, of course, the treatment provided by the juvenile 
court cannot be considered punishment. Indeed, by that test there 
is very little punishment being meted out even in maximum se-
curity adult institutions. If, however, punishment is viewed as an 
interference with an individual's liberty, through official coercion, 
predicated upon an infraction of the criminal code, then the 
juvenile court is clearly engaged in the business of punishment. 
H.L.A. Hart has frequently pointed out that by defining punish-
ment too narrowly, problems that warrant discussion are often 
erroneously obscured. 153 This is precisely what has resulted from 
the juvenile court's polarization of treatment and punishment. 
Even if the juvenile court only made dispositions for psychiatric 
or psychological care in appropriate cases, there would still be 
grounds for objection to the sole use of the treatment philosophy. 
The most forceful reason to oppose such dispositon becomes clear 
when it is remembered that a system for the civil commitment of 
the mentally ill is already in existence. Under the laws providing 
for civil commitment, the standards that authorize intervention are 
quite different from those employed by the juvenile court. 154 It is 
also interesting to note that there is considerable reason to believe 
that most delinquent children are not in need of psychiatric or 
psychological care. 155 More pragmatically, the basis used in 
150 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 141-54 (1967). 
151 Sheridan, Juveniles Who Commit Non-Criminal Acts: Why Treat in a Correctional 
System?, 31 FED. PRoe. 26 (1967). It is interesting that arguments are now being made to 
exclude from the juvenile court jurisdiction children who have not committed criminal acts 
because they do not deserve punishment. Id. 
152 Sheridan has noted the magnitude and consequences of this stigma: 
Despite all measures. statutory or otherwise. to protect from stigma the youngster 
who is a product of the correctional system. it is well known that such stigma exists 
to almost as great a degree as in the adult field. It may act as a bar to employment or 
enlistment in the armed services. It may even continue to be a handicap for years. 
There is. for example. the case of the family whose application for public housing 
was tu med down partly on the basis that the husband committed minor offenses as 
a juvenile. 
Id. at 28. 
153 H.L.A. HART, supra note 25, at 6. 
154 See Kent v. United States, 130 U.S.App. D.C. 343, 401 F.2d 408 (1%8), especially 
note 4 in Judge Burger's dissent. 
155 For an excellent discussion of the appropriateness of mental health care for delin-
quents, see Miller & Kennedy. Adolescent Delinquency and the Myth of Hospital Treat-
ment. 12 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 38 (1966). 
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juvenile court for determining whether a child is in need of treat-
ment should be observed. Section 29 of the Uniform Juvenile Court 
Act provides, "In the absence of evidence to the contrary, evi-
dence of the commission of acts which constitute a felony is suffi-
cient to sustain a finding that the child is in need of treatment or 
rehabilitation.'' 156 
By focusing exclusively on the potential of a treatment disposi-
tion, the juvenile justice system has created more problems than it 
has resolved, for it has never confronted the fundamental question 
of responsibility. Hence, the question of whom the system may 
legitimately operate against is never directly faced. 
C. A Child's Capacity for Judgment 
The doctrine of mens rea is predicated on a view of the individual 
as a free, moral agent, capable of rational activity. Therefore, while 
the purpose of the requirement of mens rea appears to have great 
force when applied to adults, when attention is directed toward 
children it could be argued its impact is dissipated. 
During the early stages of childhood it is clear that a child is not 
responsible for her actions. Only as a child grows does she begin to 
develop a sense of right and wrong and acquire the ability to 
distinguish between them. The best example to portray this growth 
is probably the development of property concepts and the idea of 
stealing.· In the early stages, perhaps all young children are poten-
tial thieves. 157 Gradually, however, education and an awareness of 
social demands cause a shift toward the development of hon-
esty .158 At precisely what point a child is capable of distinguishing 
between right and wrong and is able to act on the basis of the 
distinction is not something that is susceptible to general statement 
156 UNIFORM Jl/VENILE COURT ACT, supra note 2, § 20(b). 
157 As Anna Freud has pointed out: 
The ideas of "mine" and "not mine" which are indispensable concepts for the 
establishment of adult "honesty," develop very gradually. keeping step with the 
infant's gradual progress toward achievement of individual status. They apply first, 
probably, to the child's own body, next to the parents, then to the transitional 
objects, all of which are cathected both narcissistically and with object love. 
Significantly enough, as soon as the concept of "mine" emerges in the child's 
mind, he begins to guard his possessions fiercely andjealously against any interfer-
ence. The notion of "being deprived of' or "stolen from" is understood by him 
long before the opposite one, that other people's property has to be respected. 
Before the latter becomes meaningful, the child has to extend and intensify his 
relationships to his fellow beings and to learn empathy with their attachment to 
their property. Whatever the rate of progress in this respect, the concepts of 
"mine" and "yours" as such have little influence over the young child's.behavior, 
since they conflict witli very powerful desires for appropriation. 
A. FREUD, NORMALITY AND PATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD I 17-18 (1965). 
158 Id. ai 118. 
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by either psychology, psychiatry, or law. The common law recog-
nized this problem and incorporated a large degree of flexibility 
into the infancy defense. Through various presumptions the imma-
ture child was protected, and a child could be held responsible only 
after it was established that she could distinguish between right and 
wrong.159 
The infancy defense, however, has not been applied in juvenile 
court proceedings, 160 and few juvenile courts specify the lower age 
limits of the court's jurisdiction. 161 Thus, in theory, from the day a 
child is born, in most jurisdictions, she could be proceeded against 
as a delinquent. There are, however, no reported cases involving 
an attempt to charge delinquency against a child under the common 
law immunity age of seven. 162 Good sense seems to have pre-
vailed, at least so far. 
At the other end of the spectrum, every state sets a maximum 
age for the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. The most frequent 
maximum age is eighteen. 163 The effect of juvenile court legislation 
with no minimum age and a high maximum age, such as eighteen, is 
to eliminate the infancy defense for all within the group, while at 
the same time creating an almost conclusive presumption of in-
competence. Before the law, all members of this class are in the 
same position. 164 The teachings of the behavioral sciences, as well 
as common sense, indicate that there is a considerable difference in 
the mental and emotional makeup of an infant and a fifteen-, 
sixteen-, or seventeen-year-old youth. The objection that children 
do not possess the requisite moral judgment and should be treated 
differently from adults ignores the point that most of the youths 
over whom the juvenile court exercises its jurisdiction probably do 
have the ability to distinguish between right and wrong and to 
conform their conduct accordingly. Studies on the subject of the 
moral judgment of children, 165 indicate that the concept of respon-
sibility plays an important role not only in the law, but in psychol-
ogy as well. 166 Consequently, there may be little reason to distin-
guish between an adult and a child on the basis of the capability of 
either to make responsible judgments. In cases where the capabil-
159 See note 15 and accompanying text supra. 
160 See Borders v. United States. 256 F.2d 458, 459 (5th Cir. 1958); Juvenile Court v. 
State, 139 Tenn. 549. 201 S.W. 771 (1918). But see In re Gladys R .. I Cal.3d 855,464 P.2d 
127, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1970). 
161 S. Fox, JUVENILE COURTS IN A NUTSHELL 15 (1971). 
162 Id. at 18. 
163 Id. at 22. 
164 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE§ 2151.011 (Page 1973). 
165 See 1. PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (M. Gabain trans. 1965). 
166 See w. H. MOBERLY, RESPONSIBILITY: THE CONCEPT IN PSYCHOLOGY, IN THE LAW, 
AND IN THE CHRISTIAN FAITH 23 (1956). 
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ity is lacking, traditional principles for determining responsibility 
found in the common law appear to be in accord with the be-
havioral sciences. The values protected by the concept of respon-
sibility should not be surrendered, therefore, on the basis of a 
distinction that may not exist in reality or for which adequate 
account has already been taken. 
D. The Liberty of Children 
The central issue thus becomes whether the principles of free-
dom and liberty that are at the core of the doctrine of mens rea 
should be applicable to children as well as adults, vis-a-vis state 
intervention because of their conduct. The United States Supreme 
Court recognized this argument in the Gault case, in which Justice 
Fortas wrote: 
... a child, unlike an adult, has a right 'not to liberty but to 
custody.' He can be made to attorn to his parents, to go to 
school, etc. If his parents default in effectively performing 
their custodial functions - that is, if the child is 'delinquent' 
- the state may intervene. In doing so, it does not deprive the 
child of any rights, because he has none. It merely provides the 
'custody' to which the child is entitled. 167 
There can be little doubt that society has often treated children 
as chattels of the family unit, with no separate status. 168 In addi-
tion, society has frequently been highly solicitous of the welfare of 
children. Legislatures have enacted child labor, compulsory school 
attendance, and vaccination laws to look after the interests of 
children. There has also been, however, a distinct recognition that 
children have fundamental rights. The United States Supreme 
Court has held that several constitutional rights must be afforded 
children. 169 Many of these rights, however, could be viewed as 
simply the mechanical application of formality to proceedings in 
order to insure the trustworthiness of the outcome. When requiring 
that such safeguards as notice of the proceedings, confrontation 
and cross-examination of witnesses, or the right to counsel be 
provided, 110 the freedom of children is not necessarily recognized. 
These safeguards may be used only because they offer one of the 
best methods to obtain all the facts in any given dispute, in an 
orderly fashion, and in a way which assures full appreciation of 
167 In re Gault, 387 U.S. I. 17 (1967). 
168 See R. BREMUER, I CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA 27-49 (1970). 
169 For a brief summary of these rights, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243-44 
(1972) (Douglas. J., dissenting). 
170 All of these rights were found to be applicable to juveniles in In re Gault, 387 U.S. I 
(1967). 
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their significance. To a lesser extent, the same is true with regard 
to affording an individual a privilege against self-incrimination .171 
Certain police practices, for example, might make a confession 
obtained under circumstances of custodial interrogation unreli-
able .172 By requiring observation of the privilege against self-
incrimination, however, there also appears to be a recognition that 
the individual is a person whose liberty is important; and that if the 
government wishes to deprive the person of his liberty, it should be 
able to do so only upon the basis of competent evidence and 
without the coerced assistance of the accused. A similar respect for 
the fundamental value ofliberty can be seen in the requirement that 
the government establish its case by proof which is beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 173 Such a standard impresses upon the trier of 
fact that a decision of grave consequence is being made. The state 
should be entitled to interfere with a person's freedom only if there 
is no reasonable doubt on the issue of whether the person commit-
ted the offense. The prohibition against being twice put in 
jeopardy1 74 al so displays a concern for the freedom of children by 
pointing to the limits within which government intervention is 
justified. A clear example which shows that children share in the 
value of freedom that is cherished by our society is the protection 
afforded them by the first amendment guarantee of free speech. 1 75 
Finally, the right of a minor child to obtain an abortion over 
parental objection 1 76 demonstrates that a child is a free person 
under the Constitution. 
The Supreme Court through its. holdings has recognized that 
children are entitled to be treated as individuals who enjoy the 
rights of liberty. It is especially necessary to respect this value 
when the state is attempting to deprive a child of his freedom on the 
basis of a criminal law violation. The Court has stated that 
"[n]either man nor child can be allowed to stand condemned by 
methods which flout constitutional requirements of due process of 
law." 177 By requiring that procedural rights be afforded children, 
the Supreme Court has recognized that the ideas of freedom and 
liberty from which these constitutional limitations derive also 
apply to children. 
It is, to a certain extent, unfortunate that such forceful action by 
the Supreme Court was necessary to compel an awakening to the 
171 This right has also been held applicable to juveniles. In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1967). 
172 See Escobedo v. Illinois. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
173 See In re Winship. 397 U.S. 385 (1970). 
174 See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975). 
175 See Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
176 See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 423 U.S. 1044 (1976). 
177 In re Gault. 387 U.S. I. 13 (1967). See also Gallegos v. Colorado. 370 U.S. 49 (1962). 
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fact that children share in society's fundamental ideals. It is par-
ticularly ironic that the freedom of children has recently come into 
question under criminal law in the context that it has. It was only 
through "humanitarian" efforts of juvenile court legislation that 
children were forced to surrender their right to liberty, a right that 
had been recognized throughout the course of the common law. 
The freedom of children became an issue solely as a result of the 
early reformers and the theorists of the juvenile court and even 
then not because of any well-reasoned philosophical analysis but, 
more likely, simply because of a misapprehension of the role of the 
retributive theories of punishment. 
The Supreme Court has recently remarked concerning the dou-
ble jeopardy requirement that "[u]nder our decisions we can find 
no persuasive distinction ... between the proceeding conducted in 
[a delinquency action] and a criminal prosecution, each of which is 
designed 'to vindicate [the] very vital interest in enforcement of 
common law.' " 1 78 It has been realized, therefore, that the same 
interests are involved in both a delinquency adjudication and a 
criminal prosecution. What is needed now in the juvenile justice 
system is an appreciation of the role that the concept ofresponsibil-
ity has played in the criminal law. 
Much of the discussion in this article has focused on the realities 
of juvenile justice. Even in the most idealized system of justice, 
however, the concept of responsibility has a place. Freedom, 
which is the foundation of the doctrine of mens rea, is an ideal that 
must stand with all others in our society and be shared in by all. To 
ignore the wisdom of generations which is contained in the juris-
prudence of the criminal law is, therefore, also to ignore the highest 
values of our society. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The early juvenile justice reformers were extremely concerned 
about the imprisonment and punishment of children by the criminal 
courts of their time. Such punishment of children was frequently 
viewed as cruel and barbaric, and almost always seen as futile. 
These reformers, therefore, agitated and lobbied to remove chil-
dren from the prisons and other penal institutions in which they 
were found. They were not content, however, with simply altering 
the dispositional alternatives available for children. The reformers 
178 Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519,531 (1975). 
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succeeded in establishing an entirely separate juvenile justice sys-
tem, in which the principles of the criminal law were deemed to be 
irrelevant because only guidance and assistance were to be pro-
vided . 
. In the 150 years that have elapsed since the beginning of the 
juvenile justice reform movement, adult penology has adopted 
many of the treatment and rehabilitative goals that were once the 
hallmark of the juvenile system. In addition, many of the failings 
and abuses of juvenile justice have come to light and now demand 
correction. Indeed, it might even be suggested that the juvenile 
court experiment has created more problems than it has solved and 
consequently should be abandoned. 
Nevertheless, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement 
and the Administration of Justice, while being mindful of the dif-
ficulties involved, has recommended that the juvenile court should 
continue to exist as a separate agency .179 Perhaps it is not yet time 
to abandon the. special intake procedures or the other benefits 
available to children in thejuvenile court. Perhaps even by virtue 
of its separate status the juvenile court is made constantly aware of 
its primary objective to aid children whenever possible. It is un-
doubtedly the time, however, to attempt to put the house in order. 
The United States Supreme Court has begun to reshape the 
juvenile court through its holdings that require procedural regular-
ity in an attempt to guard against unjustifiable intervention in the 
lives of children by government. If there is a concern over the 
expansive and abusive powers of the state, however, it is not 
necessary to rediscover the wheel. The principles of the criminal 
law, particularly those embodied in the doctrine of mens rea and 
actus reus, were applied in the common law specifically as limita-
tions on governmental activity. What is needed now is a recogni-
tion that whether one adopts a utilitarian or a retributivist theory of 
law, the concept of responsibility has an important role to play. 
Through it the ideal of freedom upon which our society is founded 
is not only observed but protected. By recognizing that the concept 
of responsibility has an important function in a delinquency pro-
ceeding, the juvenile court will be adhering not only to an abstract 
metaphysical theory but to the goal to which our entire system of 
justice is dedicated. 
179 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF Jus-
TICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 9 (1967). 
